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Abstract—The Internet is a complex ecosystem composed of
thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASs) operated by inde-
pendent organizations; each AS having a very limited view
outside its own network. These complexities and limitations
impede network operators to finely pinpoint the causes of service
degradation or disruption when the problem lies outside of their
network. In this paper, we present Chocolatine, a solution
to detect remote connectivity loss using Internet Background
Radiation (IBR) through a simple and efficient method. IBR
is unidirectional unsolicited Internet traffic, which is easily
observed by monitoring unused address space. IBR features two
remarkable properties: it is originated worldwide, across diverse
ASs, and it is incessant. We show that the number of IP addresses
observed from an AS or a geographical area follows a periodic
pattern. Then, using Seasonal ARIMA to statistically model IBR
data, we predict the number of IPs for the next time window.
Significant deviations from these predictions indicate an outage.
We evaluated Chocolatine using data from the UCSD Network
Telescope, operated by CAIDA, with a set of documented outages.
Our experiments show that the proposed methodology achieves
a good trade-off between true-positive rate (90%) and false-
positive rate (2%) and largely outperforms CAIDA’s own IBR-
based detection method. Furthermore, performing a comparison
against other methods, i.e., with BGP monitoring and active
probing, we observe that Chocolatine shares a large common
set of outages with them in addition to many specific outages
that would otherwise go undetected.
Index Terms—Outage detection, Internet Background Radia-
tion, ARIMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Connectivity disruptions caused by physical outages, soft-
ware bugs, misconfiguration, censorship, or malicious activity,
occur repeatedly on the Internet [1]. Monitoring the state of
Internet connectivity is useful to raise public awareness on
events of intentional disconnection due to censorship [14]. It
further helps operators pinpoint the location of an outage,
i.e., the place where there is a loss of connectivity, when
it happens outside their reach. This enables to speed up
recovery as the correct network operator team can be contacted
directly instead of reaching out to the global network operators
community via mailing lists or personal contacts. Fast outage
detection is also useful to locally switch to backup routes,
when available [16].
A few methods exist to detect connectivity outages. Mon-
itoring for withdrawals of BGP prefixes is a commonly used
approach, but it can only observe outages that affect the control
plane [10], [2]. Data-plane approaches solve this problem, and
can be either based on active measurements—e.g., Trinocu-
lar [21] sends pings to 4 M remote /24 address blocks to mea-
sure their liveness—or on passive traffic analysis—Disco [27]
relies on the long-running TCP connections between RIPE
Atlas probes and their controlling infrastructure to identify
bursts of disconnections.
Another data-plane approach for the detection of connectiv-
ity outages, is based on the analysis of Internet Background
Radiation (IBR) [5]. IBR is unsolicited traffic captured by
darknets (also known as network telescopes), which announce
unused IP prefixes on BGP, i.e., there are no actual services
running in the prefix, nor “eyeballs”. IBR is composed of
a constantly evolving mix of various phenomena: network
scans, the results of malware infections, DoS attacks using
spoofed IPs from the range announced by the telescope [4],
packets from misconfigured (or with a polluted DHT) Bit-
Torrent clients, etc. [31]. By leveraging the pervasiveness of
IBR sources, and the consistent presence of traffic, we can
infer a connectivity outage for a given geographic area or
Autonomous System (AS) based on a significant reduction of
IBR traffic that originates from them. In addition, Dainotti et
al. [8], [5] demonstrated that IBR can effectively complement
both control-plane and active probing data-plane approaches:
both in terms of coverage (not all networks respond to pings)
and in terms of information that it provides (e.g., confirm-
ing outbound connectivity for a remote network even when
inbound connectivity is disrupted).
The IODA system from CAIDA [17] has recently opera-
tionalized this method for extracting time series, i.e., “signals”,
at different spatial grain (e.g., countries or ASs). However,
IODA’s current automated detection algorithm is simplistic (a
threshold based on the last 7 days moving median) and unable
to take into account the IBR’s noise and the intensity variabil-
ity of the signal. Indeed, in order to avoid an overwhelming
amount of false positives, the threshold is currently set to
raise an outage alert when the signal intensity drops under
25% of the intensity of the median value observed in the last
7 days. That is, an outage is detected only when there is a
severe connectivity loss, leaving many cases of connectivity
loss undetected [18]. In particular, the test remains the same
whatever the period of the day and the week, such that a drop
occurring in an usually busy period is treated the same as if it
was occurring during an inactive one. In one word, this naive
model is static, and as such, challenging to calibrate, as it does
not take into account any trends in the traffic.
In this work, we take these trends into account by applying
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Seasonal ARIMA (SARIMA) [9], a popular technique that
forecasts the behavior of the time series extracted at the
UCSD Network Telescope [29]. More specifically, we analyze
the number of unique source IP addresses that try to reach
the darknet of different countries/ASs. Chocolatine is
sensitive and robust, respectively to the seasonality and noise
observed in the data. We show that it is able to detect
outages with a true positive rate of 90% and a false posi-
tive rate of 2% with a detection delay of only 5 minutes.
Additionally, the comparison with CAIDA’s method showed
that Chocolatine can detect a large share of outages seen
by other data sources, as well as additional specific outages.
Another benefit of Chocolatine is that its algorithm auto-
matically self-tunes on time series exhibiting very different
magnitudes and levels of noise (e.g., time series of IBR
extracted for ASs and countries of different sizes and with
different compositions of IBR-generating sources). As a result,
Chocolatine can be applicable to other seasonal and noisy
data sources related to Internet traffic activity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: back-
ground on main outage detection methods is first provided
in Section II. In Section III, we then introduce the dataset
we use, and explain why it is suited for outage detection. In
Section IV, we describe Chocolatine’s high-level design.
We also illustrate our outage detection process with a case
study of censorship occurred during the Egyptian revolution
(Section V). In Section VI, we evaluate Chocolatine,
validating it with ground truth data and also comparing its per-
formances against several current outage detection algorithms.
Lastly, we address the reproducibility of our experiments in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Outage detection can be achieved with different measure-
ment techniques and performance indicators. A recent sur-
vey [1] provides a taxonomy of most existing techniques,
including three main monitoring categories: active, passive,
and hybrid. We reuse this terminology here.
Active monitoring techniques generate traffic in order to
collect information and examine the state of networks. Most
active monitoring approaches are based on variants of ping and
traceroute, and rely on a set of vantage points (i.e., the devices
that perform the measurements) that are usually distributed
across different networks. For example, RIPE Atlas [24] is a
popular platform for network measurement that is composed of
over 10,000 probes. In [12], Fontugne et al. detect significant
link delay changes and rerouting from RIPE Atlas built-in
measurements. Dasu [28], on the other hand, is more versatile
than RIPE Atlas. It has been used for diverse measurements,
such as broadband performance measurements, as well as the
mapping of the Google CDN infrastructure. Thunderping [26]
measures the connectivity of residential Internet hosts before,
during, and after forecast periods of severe weather.
Passive monitoring techniques collect existing traffic and
infer the state of networks from it. Generally speaking, they
analyze real-user traffic to be close to the user experience. It
ensures that the inferred statistics correspond to real traffic,
thus granting a view of a network’s current state. Different
datasets have been leveraged for passive analysis, such as CDN
traces [23], or darknets [3].
Outage detection methods also rely on different theoretical
modeling techniques to discriminate outages from normal net-
work conditions. Trinocular [21] leverages Bayesian inference
to estimate the reachability of /24 subnetworks. Disco [27]
detects surge of Atlas probe disconnections using a burst
modeling algorithm. Using also Atlas data, authors of [12] rely
on the central limit theorem to model usual Internet delays and
identify network disruptions.
In this work, we rely on passive measurements collected
from CAIDA’s network telescope [29] and employ SARIMA
models to forecast IBR time series and detect outages.
III. DATASET
The data used for this study is obtained from the UCSD
network telescope [29]. The goal of this section is to provide
an overview of the characteristics of this dataset, and to
motivate why it is suitable for outage detection.
The collected data consists exclusively of unsolicited traffic
caused by both benign and malicious activities. For instance,
software and hardware errors, such as bit-flipping or hard-
coded IP addresses, result in IBR traffic. Network scans and
backscatter traffic are another common source of IBR traffic.
Backscatter traffic is usually the consequence of malicious
spoofed traffic sent to a victim and whose replies are returned
to unused addresses monitored by the network telescope.
Consequently, IBR data has been extensively used to study
worms [30], virus propagation [15], and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks [11].
CAIDA’s IODA [17] aggregates UCSD network telescope
data geographically and topologically, respectively using Ne-
tAcuity [19] IP geolocation datasets and longest prefix match-
ing against BGP announcements from public BGP data [20].
Consequently, we obtain IBR streams per country, regional
area (e.g., states in the US, provinces in France, etc.), and AS.
IODA also pre-filters the traffic that reaches the telescope,
removing large components of potentially spoofed-source-IP
traffic (since their presence would significantly alter inference
about originating ASs and geographical areas) using a set of
heuristics derived semi-manually [7].
Traffic from these streams can be summarized in different
ways, the most common being the number of bytes, the number
of packets, and the number of unique source IP addresses.
The number of unique source IP addresses [8] is defined as
the number of IP addresses originating from the same location
that contact the network telescope during a given time interval.
It is an adequate metric to study Internet outages because it
counts the number of devices that send traffic at a geographical
or topological location, while abstracting the need to analyze
traffic. In the event of an outage, some of these devices get
disconnected from the Internet, so we expect to observe drops
in the number of unique source IP addresses observed by the
network telescope.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of preprocessing and seasonal integration of the training data
The usage of IBR to detect outages is particularly pertinent
since it is pervasive. Indeed, the amount of IBR packets
that reaches network telescopes is considerable, incessant, and
originates from a variety of applications [31]. In [4], Benson
et al. performed a spatial analysis and determined that IBR
provided an Internet-wide view. All countries, except for 3
with a population of less than 4000 inhabitants, and more than
half of all ASs are observed in their dataset. Note that half of
the ASs that do not show up in the dataset are small, as they
only advertise a /24 prefix, while 86% of ASs that advertise
the equivalent of a /16 or more are visible. A fifth of the
remaining 14% that do not generate IBR traffic are blocks that
belong to the US government. The temporal analysis in [4] also
shows that most networks frequently generate IBR traffic, in
particular when considering coarse grain aggregations. Indeed,
the median time between observations is shorter than 1 minute
for over 90% of countries, and is shorter than 10 minutes for
about 75% of the ASs.
To summarize, IBR traffic is ubiquitous, and thus can be
used to detect and analyze large-scale network events. It is
continually sent by a variety of sources all around the world,
which makes it a suitable source to make opportunistic world-
wide Internet measurements and specifically for efficiently
detecting outages.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe how Chocolatine fore-
casts the number of unique IP addresses in IBR traffic and
detects outages. Among the numerous approaches available
to forecast time series, Autoregressive Integrated Moving
Average (ARIMA) models are a popular choice thanks to
their simplicity and efficiency [32]. For this study we select
Seasonal-ARIMA (SARIMA) [9] models in order to deal with
weekly patterns observed in IBR time series. We propose an
outage detection method composed of four main steps. First,
we sanitize the training part of the dataset (Section IV-A)
and we eliminate non-stationarity in the data by differencing
the data with a lag of one week (Section IV-B). Second, we
compare results with multiple sets of parameters to find the
best parameters for modeling each time series, and compute
the corresponding prediction intervals (Section IV-C). Finally,
we detect and report outages based on the differences between
the computed predictions and the actual data (Section IV-D).
A. Data preparation
In the following, the IBR time series are split into three
sets: training, calibration, and test. These are used differ-
ently for the modeling (Section IV-C) and detection phases
(Section IV-D). The training and calibration sets are used for
the modeling, i.e., to learn the best set of parameters for the
ARMA model. These parameters are then used on the test set
to detect potential outages.
The training data is used as the basis of the predictive model,
and we need to sanitize it. There are three problems that need
to be addressed:
• Missing values that we need to fill to have a working
model,
• Extreme values, which will bias the model by greatly
influencing the statistical properties of the time series,
• The presence of an outage inside the training data, which
will lead to a model considering outages as the norm.
To overcome these problems we assume that the occurrence
of missing and extreme values are uncommon so we can
synthesize ten weeks of data into two weeks of sanitized data.
Our data preparation process is illustrated in Figure 1, with a
time series having the three problems mentioned above. We
consider five intervals of two weeks (top plot in Figure 1), and
compute the median values across all five intervals to obtain
two weeks of clean synthesized data (middle plot in Figure 1).
This sanitized time series is then used as the training set for
our SARIMA model.
B. SI: Seasonal Integration
ARMA models assume that the data is stationary, that is,
the statistical properties of the data (e.g., mean and variance)
are constant over time. Because of the strong daily and weekly
patterns present in IBR data, our time series are non-stationary
(e.g., there is less traffic at night and during weekends,
because more devices are turned off or disconnected during
these periods of time [22]). This is the reason why a simple
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Fig. 2: Analyzing the test set with the best model (AR = 4,MA = 1)
predictive model would not work with IBR time series. As a
result, we make our time series stationary by filtering these
trends with seasonal differencing. In practice, our time series
contain a weekly and daily trend which we both remove by
applying a seasonal differencing (SI part of SARIMA) of a
week (e.g., bottom plot in Figure 1).
The computed training data, which is now sanitized and
stationary, can then be used in the following step to create a
predictive model and to make predictions on the calibration
data.
C. ARMA: Autoregressive Moving Average
In this step, we estimate the best parameters for any
given time series. In pratice, Chocolatine will compute a
different set of parameters for each analyzed time series, which
will increase the adaptability of the solution and the quality
of the predictions. To achieve this goal, we have to precisely
estimate the values for the two key parameters of ARMA,
that is the order of the autoregressive model (named p), and
the order of the moving-average model (named q). We use the
sanitized training data for that purpose, as ARMA models only
work on the condition that the training data is anomaly free and
stationary. In order to find the best combination of parameters
for any given time series, we make predictions on a second
set of data that we refer to as the calibration data. In practice,
we use the period following the training data for defining
such a calibration. We consider several predictive models,
each with their own set of (p, q) parameters, to evaluate
the performances of various distinct predictions. We finally
compare the accuracy of these predictive models on the data
used for this calibration. We use the Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) to compute the error between the real time series
and the one obtained from the predictive model. We chose
the RMSE in order to penalize predictive models that made
predictions that are significantly far from the actual data. The
predictive model (i.e., the set of (p, q) parameters) with the
lowest error will thus be used for future predictions.
Now that we have the best parameters to use within the
ARMA model, we also compute a prediction interval. It
defines the boundaries of our predictions and it is used for
the outage detection process. We compute 99.5% prediction
intervals using the residual variance. We compute the residual
variance using the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD), a
robust measure of data variability used for anomaly detec-
tion [12] (the RMSE being not suitable enough in this case).
This is essential, as the prediction intervals should be both
robust to false positives but still able to capture extreme values
introduced by measurement errors and outages.
The model, and its associated prediction interval, are then
used to detect outages, as described in the next section.
D. Detection
The steps described above provide us with stationary data
and an optimized predictive model for each time series. The
next step is to detect outages with the predictive models.
We define an outage as a point in time where a value of a
time series is smaller than the lower bound of the prediction
interval. The severity of this alarm will be determined by
computing the following distance:
d = (Xˆ −X)/(Xˆ − L),
where Xˆ is the predicted value, X is the actual value from
the time series, and L is the lower bound of the prediction
interval. Distances d > 1 and d < −1 mean that the time
series is outside of the prediction interval, whereas the time
series is within the prediction interval when −1 ≤ d ≥ 1. The
only cases that are reported as outages are cases where d > 1,
that is, when the actual values are outside of the prediction
interval and are smaller than the lower bound of the prediction
interval, which translates in a significant drop in the number
of IPs observed in the time series. Cases where d < −1 (i.e.,
points that are greater than the upper bound of the prediction
interval) are considered as extreme values, but they do not fall
into our definition of an outage, and are thus not reported.
Every hour (i.e., 12 data points) we make predictions for
the next hour and compare the actual data to these predictions
as explained above. Each time we move forward in the data,
ARMA takes into account the new data points for the future
predictions. However, we take particular precautions to main-
tain the quality of the predictive model. Data identified as part
of an outage should not be used for future predictions, which
brings us back to the problems discussed in Section IV-A,
where missing values, extreme values, and outages would
diminish the quality of the predictive model. In this phase,
we solve these problems differently, by doing what we refer
to as inpainting: if a new sample of data is considered to be an
extreme value (i.e., d < −1 or d > 1), we feed the predictive
model with the predicted value instead of the real one.
V. CASE STUDY
To illustrate the functioning of the proposed method and
some of its benefits, this section provides thorough results from
a specific case study.
On January 25th 2011, the Mubarak regime ordered net-
work operators to shut down Internet connectivity during the
Egyptian revolution, in an attempt to silence the opposition.
The chronology of this event has been described in [8]. The
authors used BGP routing data, ping, traceroute, and IBR data.
The IBR data was manually analyzed to shed light on the
massive packet-filtering mechanisms that were put in place,
and to identify denial-of-service attacks related to the political
events happening in Egypt during the same period. In this
section, we present how our solution analyzes the same IBR
data but allows us to systematically detect the beginning and
the end of the connectivity loss, and to estimate the severity
of the outage.
Figure 2 shows the time series of unique source IP addresses
from Egypt reaching the UCSD Network Telescope (plotted
in blue). The disconnections occurred between the 28th of
January and the 3rd of February, 2011, as it can be seen by
the loss of intensity of the signal depicted in the figure. Here,
we chose to include in our analysis also the values of the time
series after the outages, because of an interesting phenomenon
that was occurring: the values of the time series are higher
than usual during the days that follow the Egyptian revolution
and go back to normal around the 7th of February. In [6], the
authors revealed that a botnet covertly (and massively) scanned
the Internet during those days.
This time series is analyzed as follows. The training set, to
the left, is sanitized following the methods discussed in IV-A.
Multiple sets of ARMA parameters are then going to be used
to predict the calibration set. The predictions are plotted with
a green line. The set of parameters that resulted in the lowest
error (p = 4, q = 1 in this case) will be used for the rest of
the analysis. The difference between the predicted time series
and the original time series allowed us to compute prediction
intervals using the MAD. These intervals are plotted with gray
bars that surround the predictions.
Then the test set is compared to the ARMA model and
the prediction intervals computed in the previous step. The
sudden drop that occurs when the outage starts, puts the time
series below the prediction intervals, which means that an
outage is reported. Visually, this is shown with a red vertical
line. Additionally, it also means that the inpainting process
described in Section IV-D will take place, which is clear here,
since the trend of the predicted time series stays similar to that
of the original time series, even if an outage is occurring at
the same time. No alarm is reported during the botnet activity
([6]) that follows the outage, because the original time series
values are higher than our prediction intervals, which means
that the data is again inpainted and it will not count as an
anomaly.
VI. VALIDATION, CALIBRATION AND COMPARISON
We evaluate the limits, and performance of
Chocolatine through a validation and a comparison.
We start by considering a set of verified outages from our
ground-truth dataset, which we use to assess the accuracy of
our outage detector, and look for the best threshold, e.g., the
one determining the minimal number of IPs required to make
accurate predictions. We then use a different set of outages
in order to compare Chocolatine against CAIDA’s outage
detection techniques (using BGP dumps, active probing and
the network telescope data).
A. Validation
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of our tech-
nique using a reference dataset and gathering 130 time series
containing outages. These time series contain three different
types of spatial aggregates—ASs, countries, and regions within
countries—from various years (2009 to 2018). The duration of
these outages spans from an hour to a week. The comprehen-
sive list of time series that compose this dataset is given in
Table II. As an example, the RIPE NCC and Duke University
BGP experiment [25] caused several outages in different ASs
worldwide by triggering a bug in some Cisco routers.
We evaluate Chocolatine by computing the True Posi-
tive Rate (TPR) and the False Positive Rate (FPR), and show
our calibration results with a ROC curve. Our purpose is
twofold: we look into the accuracy of our approach, and
we search for its best parameters by exploring its calibration
spectrum. In particular, we determine which confidence level
should be used to assess whether an outage is occurring or
not. Our aim is to find the best trade-off between the TPR and
the FPR by considering our collection of documented outages
as the ground truth.
Moreover, to quantify the ability of our method to maximize
the TPR while keeping the FPR low, we need to set two eval-
uation parameters used in our ROC analysis. On the one hand,
we need to find out the minimal intensity required in the time
series for our method to finely operate, and on the other hand,
TABLE I: Number of time series per IP threshold and per
spatial scale
> 10 > 15 > 20 > 25 Total
Countries 144(56.9%)
135
(53.3%)
128
(50.5%)
120
(47.3%) 253
Regions 1,038(21.4%)
879
(18.1%)
778
(16.0%)
704
(14.5%) 4,846
ASs 1,157(1.8%)
867
(1.4%)
719
(1.1%)
621
(1.0%) 61,639
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Fig. 3: ROC curve with a 5 minutes time grain and a threshold
of 20
the smallest time granularity at which we can accurately detect
outages. The intensity of time series is measured as the median
number of observed IPs in a week. Trying multiple thresholds
showed us that Chocolatine yielded better results with a
threshold of 20 IPs, and that increasing this number had little
effect on the accuracy. The results are presented in Figure 3,
where three different ROC curves are plotted:
• The green curve plots the accuracy for all time series;
• The red curve plots the accuracy for time series with a
median of IP addresses in a week that is greater than 20;
• The blue curve plots the accuracy for time series with a
median of IP addresses in a week that is smaller than 20.
On the one hand, using a small number of IP addresses
provides performance only slightly better than using a random
model, which is expected, as the central limit theorem does
not hold for samples that are too small. On the other hand, the
higher the number of IPs is, the better the performance. (the
red curve yields much better results than the blue one). The
accuracy of our method for all time series (the green curve),
is not satisfactory because of the influence of the time series
contained in the blue curve. As a result, we have chosen to
limit our analysis to the time series that have a median of
more than 20 IPs per week.
Table I summarizes the impact of this threshold on the
number of remaining time series. Setting this threshold to 20
limits the number of time series that we can analyze to 1625,
but it significantly increases the accuracy of our detector. Here,
we make the assumption that network operators will want to
have a low FPR, even if it means missing smaller outages.
We also found that the size of the time bins we use can
be relatively small (around 5 minutes) without impacting the
performance much. This analysis is not included due to space
constraints.
To conclude this section, we recommend to use a threshold
of 20 IPs for the time series and 5 minutes long time-
windows as in Figure 3. These two parameters can of course
be tuned according to the data collection’s specificity. Using
such a threshold and time granularity (we can estimate outage
durations at a 5 min granularity), the best confidence level for
the prediction intervals is 99, 5% (3σ). With these settings we
obtain an acceptable true positive rate of 90% while keeping
the false positive rate under 2%.
B. Comparison
In this section, we compare the performance of our detector
to three other techniques hosted in IODA: CAIDA’s darknet
detector (DN), CAIDA’s BGP detector (BGP), and a technique
based on active probing (AP), Trinocular [21]. A description
of the integration of these 3 detectors in IODA can be
found in [18]. In order to compare the detectors, we use a
second ground-truth sample to emphasize the versatility of
Chocolatine on different time series. Its set of outages
is distinct from the previous one, but still decomposed in
5 minutes bins (see Table III). We ran the 4 detectors and
enumerated the number of 5 minutes time bins where an
outage is detected, for each detector. Fig. 4 a plots the number
of outages detected by IODA’s components, and Fig. 4 b
plots how Chocolatine compares against BGP and Active
Probing (AP) detectors. Note that the number of events given
below the name of each detector are events detected only with
that technique. The intersections depict the number of events
detected by multiple detectors. For example, there are 1680
BGP events (the sum of each intersection combination in the
magenta based set), 985 of which are also detected by the
active probing technique.
Comparing Chocolatine with the IODA’s darknet detec-
tor, one can observe that Chocolatine detects two order of
magnitude more outages, 1193 compared to 71. This result
highlights the much higher sensitivity of our approach, while
CAIDA’s darknet detector is extremely conservative by nature.
By modeling weekly, and a fortiori daily, patterns our pre-
dictions are adaptively following the time series oscillations,
while this is not the case in CAIDA’s detector, which uses a
global threshold approach.
Another way to evaluate Chocolatine is to cross-
reference the set of alarms it is able to detect compared to
the other detectors (and look at all the intersections). When
there are intersections, the corresponding events are very likely
to be actual outages, i.e., they are true positives. Fig. 4 b
shows that the outages detected by Chocolatine are likely
to intersect the outages of the other sources. Indeed, there
are only 251 alarms that are specific to Chocolatine. The
analysis of these alarms shows us that 59% of them occur
in a range of 1 hour around alarms detected by other data
sources. Generally speaking, these results suggest that our tool
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the number of 5 minutes time bins identified as outage per detector
is complementary to the two others (BGP and AP) and clearly
outperforms IODA’s current darknet detector.
VII. REPRODUCIBILITY
All results presented in this paper are easily reproducible
by the research community. Our source code is made publicly
available [13] and it automatically fetches and processes IBR
data, which means that the dataset is also available. The code
is structured in such a way that one simply needs to format
its data according to our data format to be able to launch
Chocolatine on different data sources.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed Chocolatine, which detects
remote outages using Internet Background Radiation traffic.
The underlying predictive methodology is based on SARIMA
models. Both the method and the data are easy to respectively
deploy and collect in most ISP. We show that our method
detects outages as quickly as 5 minutes after their occurrence,
with a 90% true positive rate and a small percentage of false
alarms (2%). Chocolatine is able to detect outages in time
series with as little as 20 IP addresses. Moreover, we compare
its performance against other passive and active detectors. Its
share of common events with other sources is high, while each
technique seems able to reveal specific events. We observe
that the shares of common events, the overall and two-by-two
intersections, are the most significant, while each technique
seems able to reveal specific events too.
Our method is tailored to seasonal data and is robust to
noise. It is therefore applicable to many other data sources
reflecting Internet activity. For example, we plan to experiment
its deployment on access logs of widely popular content, while
its operational integration into the CAIDA’s IODA outage
detection system [17] is already in progress.
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